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## Dirty Trick Branch for Pentagon?

By Rowland Evans Jr.  
WASHINGTON, May 10.—

A survey in high quarters today disclosed powerful opposition to transferring the para-military operations of the Central Intelligence Agency into the Pentagon.

Both within the Administration and among the most influential Congressional leaders, the opinion was growing that it would be a bad mistake to put the civilian and military leader of the armed services in direct control of what is sometimes called "the Department of Dirty Tricks."

A central reason for this opposition is this: If the Defense Department had control over para-military forces—the instruments of subversion, guerrilla warfare and the like—the regular military establishment would tend automatically to become implicated in any para-military undertaking. To the extent that it did, the operation would tend to be linked to the uniformed services and its undercover nature would be more difficult to preserve. The strength of this growing

attitude was reflected generally today on Capitol Hill, where the Senate Democratic leader, Sen. Mike Mansfield, Mont., remarked in an interview:

"We must not place the para-military force under the direct control of the Pentagon. If that happened, the possibility of dangerous confusion between the regular and what you might call the 'irregular' forces would always be present. It is apparent to me that it would be a terrible mistake if that kind of recommendation came from the Taylor committee."

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor is now in the middle of a study of the whole question of para-military forces, of the capacity of this country to sustain such forces and of their organization within the executive branch of government. Helping him is the President's brother-in-law, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, and two others—Allen W. Dulles, director of the C. I. A., and Adm. Arleigh A. Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.

At issue, in the President's words, is whether this country has been too long preoccupied with "traditional military needs, on armies prepared to cross borders, or missiles poised for flight."

### Stirred by Cuba

What brought the issue to a head was the fiasco of the Cuban invasion. The C. I. A. was responsible both for making the intelligence estimates and for doing the basic military planning for the anti-Castro Cuban rebels. Separation of the intelligence and the operational features of the C. I. A. has had wide support here ever since the Cuba story started unfolding.

Thus Sen. Styles Bridges, R.,

N. H., who is one of the handful of members of Congress privy to C. I. A. budget and operations, said today that he strongly supports a division of intelligence and para-military operations. Until recently, he said, he believed that the Defense Department was the proper place for operations. Now, he said, he is finding "considerable opposition" to this change and instead tends to support a reorganization of the agency that would split the two functions down the middle—but leave both under the same boss.

"One man should be at the top, co-ordinating both the gathering of intelligence and the planning of various operations that flow from the intelligence. As it is now, the same people are doing both jobs. I think we should take a fellow from the military, perhaps from the Marine Corps, one who has had first-rate experience in para-military operations, and put him in charge of the para-military end of it."

It is assumed that the Taylor-Kennedy-Burke-Dulles survey has taken account of the views of Sen. Bridges and other powerful figures in the Capitol whose support will be useful when the President finally decides how to proceed. Mr. Kennedy's study panel is engaged in private interviewing of many sources to get as wide a cross-section of informed opinion as possible. The committee is operating under a tight cloak of secrecy.

Within the Administration, it may be said, there is highly influential opinion that opposes transferring any part of the C. I. A. apparatus to the Defense Department. Coupled with the developing opinion in Congress, this opposition is now believed likely to play a decisive role in the Taylor recommendations.